Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- 1 The Contents of Perceptual Experience: Opposing Views -- 1.1 The Content View -- 1.2 Sensory Content vs. Representational Content -- 1.3 Varieties of Content 1 -- 1.4 Nonconceptual Content (NCC) -- 1.5 Varieties of Content 2 -- 1.6 Phenomenology -- 1.6.1 Richness and Fineness of Grain -- 1.6.2 Perceptual Illusions -- 1.6.3 Memory -- 1.6.4 Demonstrative Identification and Reference -- 1.7 Perceptual Content and Empirical Beliefs -- 1.8 Content and Normativity -- 2 Are the Roots of the Debate Kantian? -- 2.1 McDowell's Kant -- 2.2 Kant and the "Myth of the Given" -- 2.3 Kant's Notion of Experience and the Conceptualism vs. Nonconceptualism Debate -- 2.4 Kant, Nonconceptual Content, and Body in Cognition -- 3 Kant on Nonconceptual Content: Sensations and Intuitions -- 3.1 Representational Content Revisited -- 3.2 Nonrepresentational Content: Sensations -- 3.3 Nonconceptual Content: Intuitions -- 3.4 The Forms of Intuition -- 3.4.1 Forms as a priori Intuitions -- 3.4.2 The Separation Argument -- 3.4.3 The Objects of Pure Intuition -- 3.5 The Ambiguity of "Perceiving" -- 4 Kant on Concepts in Experience -- 4.1 The Point of Departure -- 4.2 "The Same Function" -- 4.3 Three Syntheses: Does Apprehension Require Recognition? -- 4.3 Non-Conscious Spontaneity? Schematism and the Transcendental Imagination -- 4.4 The "I think" of the Transcendental Apperception -- 4.5 Syntheses and Intuitions: Are Space and Time "Given" or "Constructed"? -- 4.6 Non-Cognitive Perception -- 5 Nonconceptual Content and Transcendental Idealism -- 5.1 What Is Transcendental Idealism? -- 5.2 And How Does It Bear on Nonconceptualism? -- 5.3 The Empirical and the Transcendental -- 5.4 Sensory Content and Cognitive Constraints -- 5.4.1 "The problem of affection" -- 5.4.2 Space and Time.

5.5 Empirical Realism, Transcendental Idealism, and Nonconceptual Content -- 5.6 Concepts, Intuitions, and Transcendental Idealism -- 6 Kant and Naturalism about the Mind -- 6.1 Spinoza and Hume -- 6.2 Nonconceptualism and Naturalism -- 6.3 McDowell's Naturalism of the "Second Nature" -- 6.4 Kant's "Transcendental Psychology" and Naturalism -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant's conception of intuition and contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content. It is argued that intuition provides the most basic form of intentionality - pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.