Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Why the capability approach? -- 1.2 The worries of the sceptics -- 1.3 A yardstick for the evaluation of prosperity and progress -- 1.4 Scope and development of the capability approach -- 1.5 A guide for the reader -- 2. Core Ideas and the Framework -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 A preliminary definition of the capability approach -- 2.3 The capability approach versus capability theories -- 2.4 The many modes of capability analysis -- 2.5 The modular view of the capability approach -- 2.6 The A-module: the non-optional core of all capability theories -- 2.6.1 A1: Functionings and capabilities -- 2.6.2 A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories -- 2.6.3 A3: Conversion factors -- 2.6.4 A4: The means-ends distinction -- 2.6.5 A5: Functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space -- 2.6.6 A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value -- 2.6.7 A7: Value pluralism -- 2.6.8 A8: The principle of each person as an end -- 2.7 The B-modules: non-optional modules with optional content -- 2.7.1 B1: The purpose of the capability theory -- 2.7.2 B2: The selection of dimensions -- 2.7.3 B3: Human diversity -- 2.7.4 B4: Agency -- 2.7.5 B5: Structural constraints -- 2.7.6 B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both -- 2.7.7 B7: Meta-theoretical commitments -- 2.8 The C-modules: contingent modules -- 2.8.1 C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories -- 2.8.2 C2: Weighing dimensions -- 2.8.3 C3: Methods for empirical analysis. -- 2.8.4 C4: Additional normative principles and concerns -- 2.9 The modular view of the capability account: a summary -- 2.10 Hybrid theories -- 2.11 The relevance and implications of the modular view -- 2.12 A visualisation of the core conceptual elements -- 2.13 The narrow and broad uses of the capability approach -- 2.14 Conclusion.

3. Clarifications -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Refining the notions of 'capability' and 'functioning' -- 3.2.1 Capability as an opportunity versus capability as an opportunity set -- 3.2.2 Nussbaum's terminology -- 3.2.3 What are 'basic capabilities'? -- 3.2.4 Conceptual and terminological refinements -- 3.3 Are capabilities freedoms, and if so, which ones? -- 3.3.1 Capabilities as positive freedoms? -- 3.3.2 Capabilities as opportunity or option freedoms? -- 3.3.3 Are capabilities best understood as freedoms? -- 3.4 Functionings or capabilities? -- 3.5 Human diversity in the capability approach -- 3.6 Collective capabilities -- 3.7 Which notion of wellbeing is used in the capability approach? -- 3.7.1 The aim and context of accounts of wellbeing -- 3.7.2 The standard taxonomy of philosophical wellbeing accounts -- 3.7.3 The accounts of wellbeing in the capability approach -- 3.8 Happiness and the capability approach -- 3.8.1 What is the happiness approach? -- 3.8.2 The ontological objection -- 3.8.3 Mental adaptation and social comparisons -- 3.8.4 Comparing groups -- 3.8.5 Macro analysis -- 3.8.6 The place of happiness in the capability approach -- 3.9 The capability approach and adaptive preferences -- 3.10 Can the capability approach be an explanatory theory? -- 3.11 A suitable theory for all normative questions? -- 3.12 The role of resources in the capability approach -- 3.13 The capability approach and theories of justice -- 3.13.1 A brief description of the literature on theories of justice -- 3.13.2 What do we need for a capability theory of justice? -- 3.13.3 From theories of justice to just practices and policies -- 3.14 Capabilities and human rights -- 3.14.1 What are human rights? -- 3.14.2 The interdisciplinary scholarship on human rights -- 3.14.3 Why a capability-based account of human rights?.

3.14.4 Are capabilities sufficient to construct a theory of human rights? -- 3.14.5 The disadvantages -- 3.15 Conclusion -- 4. Critiques and Debates -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Is everything that's called a capability genuinely a capability? -- 4.3 Should we commit to a specific list of capabilities? -- 4.4 Why not use the notion of needs? -- 4.5 Does the capability approach only address the government? -- 4.6 Is the capability approach too individualistic? -- 4.6.1 Different forms of individualism -- 4.6.2 Does the capability approach pay sufficient attention to groups? -- 4.6.3 Social structures, norms and institutions in the capability approach -- 4.7 What about power and political economy? -- 4.7.1 Which account of power and choice? -- 4.7.2 Should we prioritise analysing the political economy? -- 4.8 Is the capability approach a liberal theory? -- 4.9 Why 'human development' is not the same idea -- 4.10 Can the capability approach change welfare economics? -- 4.10.1 Welfare economics and the economics discipline -- 4.10.2 Non-welfarism -- 4.10.3 Empirical possibilities and challenges -- 4.10.4 Towards a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics? -- 4.11 Taking stock -- 5. Which Future for the Capability Approach? -- References -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.