Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- Introduction -- 1 National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for India -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Standards and the International Standard-Setting Landscape -- 3 Firm-Level Participation in Standard-Setting -- 4 Patents and Standards -- 4.1 Patenting Standards -- 4.2 SSO Patent Policies -- 5 Impact of Patents on International Participation in Standard-Setting -- 5.1 Patenting by SSO Participants -- 5.2 Patent Licensing Dynamics -- 6 Potential Responses -- 6.1 Embrace the Status Quo -- 6.2 Adopt Protectionist Measures -- 6.3 Increase Patenting by Local Firms -- 6.4 Benefits of Increased SSO Participation by Local Firms -- 6.5 Incentivizing Increased SSO Participation -- 6.6 Applications in India -- 7 Conclusion -- 2 FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Industry Standards -- 3 Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patent Licensing -- 4 SSO Licensing Policies and FRAND Commitments -- 5 FRAND Terms Determination and Recent U.S. Court Decisions -- 5.1 FRAND Commitments Are Binding -- 5.2 Additional Requirements for FRAND Analysis -- 6 Impact of FRAND on Patent Royalties -- 7 Federal Circuit Ruling on CSIRO and the Relevance of FRAND Commitments -- 8 Conclusion -- 3 The Policy Implications of Licensing Standard Essential FRAND-Committed Patents in Bundles -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Important Economic Principles -- 2.1 The Single Rent Theorem -- 2.2 The Economic Literature on Bundling -- 3 Tying and Bundling with FRAND-Committed Patents -- 3.1 Patent Holders with Licensing Options Outside of the Standard-An Alternative Interpretation of B and S -- 3.2 Licensing FRAND-Committed and Non-FRAND-Committed Patents Together -- 4 Policy Implications.

4 Calculating FRAND Licensing Fees: A Proposal of Basic Pro-competitive Criteria -- 1 Introduction -- 2 First Step: Precise Identification of, and Fees' Strictly Proportional to, the Technology to Be Effectively Adopted by the Willing Licensees -- 3 Second Step: Royalties Determination Ex ante, i.e., Taking into Account the Value of the Patent Prior to the Standard Setting -- 4 Third Step: Looking at the Overall Licensing Scenario and Royalty Stacking Issues -- 5 Fourth Step: Dynamic Approach to FRAND Royalties' Determination -- 6 Conclusion -- 5 Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust Perspective -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Standardization Process, Its Benefits and the Risks for Competition -- 3 The FRAND Commitment -- 4 Portfolio Licensing -- 4.1 Patent Law Issues -- 4.2 EU Competition Law Issues -- 4.3 Component-Level Licensing -- 5 SEP Transfers and PAEs -- 5.1 Potential Issues -- 6 Competition, Intellectual Property Rights and Collaboratively Set Standards: Federal Trade Commission Advocacy and Enforcement -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The FTC's Tools to Promote Innovation and Competition -- 1.2 The Intersection of Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law -- 2 FTC Policy Reports Discuss Economic Issues Raised by Collaborative Standard Setting -- 3 The FTC's Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding Standardization in the 1980s -- 3.1 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation -- 3.2 In re American Society of Sanitary Engineering -- 3.3 Allied Tube &amp -- Conduit Corporation v. Indian Head, Inc. -- 4 The FTC's Enforcement Regarding Standard Setting Conduct Involving Patented Technologies -- 4.1 In re Dell Computer Corporation -- 4.2 In re Union Oil Company of California -- 4.3 In re Rambus, Incorporated -- 4.4 In re Negotiated Data Solutions.

5 The FTC's Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding the Voluntary FRAND Commitment -- 5.1 The Interpretation of the FRAND Commitment -- 5.2 Competition Advocacy Regarding Remedies for Infringement of a FRAND-Encumbered Patent -- 5.3 Enforcement Actions Regarding Seeking Injunctive Relief on FRAND-Encumbered Patents -- 5.3.1 In re Robert Bosch GmbH -- 5.3.2 In re Google, Inc. and Motorola Mobility, Inc. -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 Standard Setting Organizations and Competition Laws: Lessons and Suggestions from the United States -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Holdup Problem -- 2.1 Disclosure of Standard-Essential Patents -- 2.2 RAND Commitments -- 3 Do U.S. Antitrust Laws Require Vague Royalty Commitments? -- 3.1 Relevant Antitrust Principles -- 3.2 The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act -- 3.3 Statements of Antitrust Enforcers -- 3.4 Required Disclosure of License Demands -- 4 Recommendations -- 4.1 Mandatory Disclosures -- 4.2 Precautions -- 5 Conclusion -- 8 FRAND in India -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Hold-Up and Hold-Out -- 3 U.S. and EU Law on Injunctive Relief for FRAND-Assured SEPs -- 4 The Case Against Special Legislation or Amendments to Regulate FRAND Licensing -- 5 The Dangers of Adopting a One-Size-Fits-All Template for SDOs -- 6 Problems with Regulating Royalty Rates or Prohibiting "Excessive Pricing" -- 7 Non-disclosure Agreements and Transparency -- 8 Settlement and Remedies for Disputes Involving FRAND-Assured SEPs -- 9 Conclusion -- 9 CCI's Investigation of Abuse of Dominance: Adjudicatory Traits in Prima Facie Opinion -- 1 Introduction -- 2 CCI v Ericsson: The Jurisdiction of CCI Upheld by Delhi High Court -- 3 Initial Investigation Orders by CCI -- 3.1 Abuse of Dominance Investigation Under the Competition Act -- 3.2 Prima Facie Order of Investigation: Guidelines from Non-ICT Cases.

4 The Practice Followed by CCI in Prima Facie Orders and the ICT Sector -- 5 Information Considered at the Prima Facie Stage in ICT Sector -- 6 Conclusion.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.