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Reflections on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident : Toward Social-Scientific Literacy and Engineering Resilience.

Yazar:Ahn, Joonhong
Katkıda bulunan(lar):Carson, Cathryn | Jensen, Mikael | Juraku, Kohta | Nagasaki, Shinya | Tanaka, Satoru
Materyal türü: KonuKonuYayıncı: Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2014Telif hakkı tarihi: �2015Tanım: 1 online resource (456 pages)İçerik türü:text Ortam türü:computer Taşıyıcı türü: online resourceISBN: 9783319120904Tür/Form:Electronic books.Ek fiziksel biçimler:Print version:: Reflections on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear AccidentLOC classification: TK9001-9401Çevrimiçi kaynaklar: Click to View
İçindekiler:
Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1 Integrating Social-Scientific Literacy in Nuclear Engineering Education -- Abstract -- 1.1 Preamble -- 1.2 GoNERI -- 1.3 PAGES -- 1.4 PAGES 2009 and 2010 Summer Schools -- 1.5 Concept, Aim, and Design of PAGES 2011 Summer School -- 1.5.1 Planning for PAGES 2011 Summer School -- 1.5.2 Aim and Design of PAGES 2011 Program -- 1.5.3 Specific Arrangements for Educational Effectiveness -- 1.6 Results and Evaluation -- 1.6.1 Points Discussed During the Program -- 1.6.2 Evaluation of PAGES 2011 -- 1.7 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Part I Understanding the Fukushima Daiichi Accident and Its Consequences -- 2 Event Sequence of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident -- Abstract -- 2.1 Overview of the Accident -- 2.2 Unprecedented Mega-Earthquake -- 2.3 Tsunami -- 2.4 Accident Progression for Units 1-3 -- 2.4.1 Unit 1 -- 2.4.1.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival -- 2.4.1.2 From the Tsunami Arrival to Reactor Water Level Decrease -- 2.4.1.3 From the Reactor Water Level Decrease to PCV Pressure Increase -- 2.4.1.4 From Containment Vessel Pressure Increase to Containment Venting Operation -- 2.4.1.5 From the Containment Venting Operation to Reactor Building Explosion -- 2.4.1.6 From the Reactor Building Explosion to March 18 -- 2.4.2 Unit 2 -- 2.4.2.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival -- 2.4.2.2 From Tsunami Arrival to Reactor Water Level Increase -- 2.4.2.3 From Reactor Water Level Increase to Loss of RCIC Functions -- 2.4.2.4 From Loss of RCIC Functions to Forced Depressurization by SRV Operation -- 2.4.2.5 From Forced Depressurization by SRV to PCV Pressure Decrease Initiation -- 2.4.2.6 From PCV Pressure Decrease Initiation to March 18 -- 2.4.3 Unit 3 -- 2.4.3.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival -- 2.4.3.2 From the Tsunami Arrival to RCIC Shutdown.
2.4.3.3 From RCIC Shutdown to HPCI Shutdown -- 2.4.3.4 From HPCI Shutdown to Reactor Depressurization -- 2.4.3.5 From Reactor Depressurization to Reactor Building Explosion -- 2.4.3.6 From the Reactor Building Explosion to Late March -- 2.5 Present Situation of Cores and PCVs of Units 1-3 -- 2.5.1 Unit 1 -- 2.5.2 Unit 2 -- 2.5.3 Unit 3 -- 2.6 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling -- 2.7 Plant Explosion -- 2.7.1 Units 1 and 3 -- 2.7.2 Unit 4 -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 3 Analysis of Radioactive Release from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station -- Abstract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Methods of Analysis -- 3.2.1 General Concepts for Various Models -- 3.2.2 Model 1: Release from Fuel with KnownAssumed Inventory -- 3.2.3 Model 2: Codes for Severe Accident Progression Analysis -- 3.2.4 Model 3: Atmospheric Transport Model -- 3.2.5 Model 4: Ambient Dose Rate from the Contaminated Ground -- 3.3 Occurrence of the Accident and Release, Transport, and Washout of the Radiation Plume -- 3.4 Evaluations -- 3.4.1 Approach Based on Radionuclide Release Analysis: Model 1 -- 3.4.2 Approach Based on Radiation Monitor -- 3.4.2.1 Result of the Standard Method Based on SPEEDI Simulation: Model 3 -- 3.4.2.2 Alternative Method Based on Ground Shine: Model 4 -- 3.4.2.3 Crosscheck of the Evaluation -- 3.4.3 Comparison Between Approaches -- 3.4.4 Contamination and Environmental Cleanup -- 3.5 Summary and Conclusion -- References -- 4 Environmental Contamination and Decontamination After Fukushima Daiichi Accident -- Abstract -- 4.1 Prologue -- 4.2 Environmental Contamination -- 4.2.1 Surface Radioactivity Concentrations -- 4.2.1.1 Areal Extension of Contamination -- 4.2.1.2 Radionuclides of Concern -- 4.2.1.3 Radioactivity Concentrations -- 4.2.2 Radiation Doses Due to Contamination -- 4.2.2.1 Sievert -- 4.2.2.2 Pathways that Cause Radiation Dose -- 4.2.2.3 Hourly Dose.
4.2.2.4 Annual Dose -- 4.2.3 Regulatory Guidelines -- 4.3 Modeling of Decontamination to Help Decision Making -- 4.3.1 Purpose of Modeling -- 4.3.2 Mechanisms Considered in the Model -- 4.3.2.1 Radioactive Decay -- 4.3.2.2 Natural Dispersion -- 4.3.2.3 Artificial Decontamination -- 4.3.3 Results -- 4.4 Waste Generation by Decontamination -- 4.4.1 Model and Data -- 4.4.2 Results -- 4.5 Concluding Remarks: Conflicting Values and Motives -- References -- 5 Long-Term Energy and Environmental Strategies -- Abstract -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Regionally Disaggregated DNE21 -- 5.3 Nuclear and Photovoltaic (PV) Modeling -- 5.4 Model Simulation -- 5.4.1 Simulation Assumptions and Settings -- 5.4.2 Calculated Results -- 5.5 Energy Modeling Challenge After Fukushima -- 5.6 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Impact of Fukushima Daiichi Accident on Japan's Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Spent Fuel Management -- Abstract -- 6.1 Status Quo -- 6.2 How Has This Status Quo Been Generated? -- 6.3 What Are the Problems with the Current Situation? -- References -- 7 Political Impact of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident in Europe -- Abstract -- 7.1 Earlier Accidents -- 7.1.1 The Three Mile Island Accident -- 7.1.2 The Chernobyl Accident -- 7.2 The Fukushima Accident and Radiological Impact -- 7.2.1 The Accident -- 7.2.2 The Size of the Radiological Impact Outside Japan -- 7.3 Technical Assessments and Stress Tests in Europe -- 7.3.1 IAEA Reports -- 7.3.2 The European Union -- 7.4 Political Impact in Europe from Fukushima -- 7.5 Influence of Green Politics in Europe -- References -- Part II Etiology -- 8 Where Was the Weakness in Application of Defense-in-Depth Concept and Why? -- Abstract -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Weakness in the Application of Defense-in-Depth Concept -- 8.2.1 Level 1 -- 8.2.1.1 Setting DesignEvaluation Basis -- 8.2.1.2 Technical Lessons.
8.2.1.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background -- 8.2.1.4 Possible Institutional Issue in the Background -- 8.2.2 Level 4 -- 8.2.2.1 Assumptions in Accident Management -- 8.2.2.2 Technical Lessons -- 8.2.2.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background -- 8.2.2.4 Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background -- 8.2.3 Level 5 -- 8.2.3.1 Identified Problems During the Course of Accident -- Monitoring and Ingestion Control -- Computerized Projection System -- Evacuation -- Radiation Protection Standards -- Risk Communication -- 8.2.3.2 Technical Lessons -- 8.2.3.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background -- 8.2.3.4 Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background -- 8.3 Nuclear Safety Regulation -- 8.3.1 Two-Agency System -- 8.3.2 Hardware Focus -- 8.3.3 Frequent Shuffling -- 8.4 Differences in Plant Responses Among 17 Nuclear Power Plants -- 8.5 Cultural Attitude Issues -- 8.5.1 General Observation -- 8.5.2 Related Studies -- 8.5.3 Link with National Culture -- 8.5.3.1 Collectivism, Group Thinking, Insufficient CriticalReflective Thinking and Questioning Attitude, not Raising Concerns -- 8.5.3.2 Lack of Big-Picture Thinking, Losing Sight of Substance by Being Distracted by Formality and Details -- 8.5.3.3 Hardware Culture and Technology-Focus -- 8.5.3.4 Positive Aspects -- 8.5.4 Future Directions -- 8.6 Conclusions -- References -- 9 Ethics, Risk and Safety Culture -- Abstract -- 9.1 Preamble -- 9.2 Introduction -- 9.3 Preliminaries -- 9.4 Historical Perspective on Culture and Technology -- 9.5 Safety Culture, Ethics and Risk -- 9.6 Uncertainty and Safety Philosophy -- 9.7 Reflections on Fukushima Daiichi -- 9.8 Where Do We Go from Here? -- References -- 10 The "Structural Disaster" of the Science-Technology-Society Interface -- Abstract -- 10.1 Introduction.
10.2 The "Structural Disaster" of the Science-Technology-Society Interface -- 10.3 The Basic Points About the Fukushima Daiichi Accident from the Perspective of "Structural Disaster" -- 10.4 The Development Trajectory of the Kanpon Type and Its Pitfalls -- 10.5 The Accident Kept Secret -- 10.6 The Hidden Accident and the Outbreak of War with the U.S. and Britain: How Did Japan Deal with the Problem? -- 10.7 The Sociological Implications for the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Beyond Success or Failure -- 10.8 Conclusion: Prospects for the Future -- References -- 11 Three Mile Island and Fukushima -- Abstract -- Part III Basis for Moving Forward -- 12 Implications and Lessons for Advanced Reactor Design and Operation -- Abstract -- 12.1 Short Reflection of Basic Safety Issues -- 12.2 Lessons Learned and Recommendations Derived -- 12.2.1 Natural Hazards -- 12.2.2 Emergency Power Supply -- 12.2.3 Loss of Heat Sink -- 12.2.4 Hydrogen Detonation -- 12.2.5 Measurement at Severe Accidents -- 12.2.6 Management of Severe Accident -- 12.3 Recommendations and Requirements Derived from Lessons Learned -- 12.4 Examples for Potential Countermeasures andor Technologies to be Applied -- 12.4.1 External Events -- 12.4.1.1 Earthquake -- 12.4.1.2 Tsunami -- 12.4.2 Design of Buildings, Systems and Components -- 12.4.2.1 Sites with More Than One Reactor -- 12.4.2.2 Off-Site and On-Site Electricity Supply -- 12.4.2.3 Bunkering of Buildings with Safety Related Systems -- Emergency Feed Building -- Robustness of Cooling Chain in BWRs and PWRs -- 12.4.2.4 Passive Components and Systems Using Natural Forces -- Isolation Condenser -- Gravity Driven Cooling System -- Passive Containment Cooling System -- Emergency Condenser -- Containment Cooling Condenser -- Passive Pressure Pulse Transmitter -- Passive Residual Heat Removal System -- Passive Containment Cooling System.
Advanced Accumulator.
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Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1 Integrating Social-Scientific Literacy in Nuclear Engineering Education -- Abstract -- 1.1 Preamble -- 1.2 GoNERI -- 1.3 PAGES -- 1.4 PAGES 2009 and 2010 Summer Schools -- 1.5 Concept, Aim, and Design of PAGES 2011 Summer School -- 1.5.1 Planning for PAGES 2011 Summer School -- 1.5.2 Aim and Design of PAGES 2011 Program -- 1.5.3 Specific Arrangements for Educational Effectiveness -- 1.6 Results and Evaluation -- 1.6.1 Points Discussed During the Program -- 1.6.2 Evaluation of PAGES 2011 -- 1.7 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Part I Understanding the Fukushima Daiichi Accident and Its Consequences -- 2 Event Sequence of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident -- Abstract -- 2.1 Overview of the Accident -- 2.2 Unprecedented Mega-Earthquake -- 2.3 Tsunami -- 2.4 Accident Progression for Units 1-3 -- 2.4.1 Unit 1 -- 2.4.1.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival -- 2.4.1.2 From the Tsunami Arrival to Reactor Water Level Decrease -- 2.4.1.3 From the Reactor Water Level Decrease to PCV Pressure Increase -- 2.4.1.4 From Containment Vessel Pressure Increase to Containment Venting Operation -- 2.4.1.5 From the Containment Venting Operation to Reactor Building Explosion -- 2.4.1.6 From the Reactor Building Explosion to March 18 -- 2.4.2 Unit 2 -- 2.4.2.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival -- 2.4.2.2 From Tsunami Arrival to Reactor Water Level Increase -- 2.4.2.3 From Reactor Water Level Increase to Loss of RCIC Functions -- 2.4.2.4 From Loss of RCIC Functions to Forced Depressurization by SRV Operation -- 2.4.2.5 From Forced Depressurization by SRV to PCV Pressure Decrease Initiation -- 2.4.2.6 From PCV Pressure Decrease Initiation to March 18 -- 2.4.3 Unit 3 -- 2.4.3.1 From the Earthquake to Tsunami Arrival -- 2.4.3.2 From the Tsunami Arrival to RCIC Shutdown.

2.4.3.3 From RCIC Shutdown to HPCI Shutdown -- 2.4.3.4 From HPCI Shutdown to Reactor Depressurization -- 2.4.3.5 From Reactor Depressurization to Reactor Building Explosion -- 2.4.3.6 From the Reactor Building Explosion to Late March -- 2.5 Present Situation of Cores and PCVs of Units 1-3 -- 2.5.1 Unit 1 -- 2.5.2 Unit 2 -- 2.5.3 Unit 3 -- 2.6 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling -- 2.7 Plant Explosion -- 2.7.1 Units 1 and 3 -- 2.7.2 Unit 4 -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 3 Analysis of Radioactive Release from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station -- Abstract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Methods of Analysis -- 3.2.1 General Concepts for Various Models -- 3.2.2 Model 1: Release from Fuel with KnownAssumed Inventory -- 3.2.3 Model 2: Codes for Severe Accident Progression Analysis -- 3.2.4 Model 3: Atmospheric Transport Model -- 3.2.5 Model 4: Ambient Dose Rate from the Contaminated Ground -- 3.3 Occurrence of the Accident and Release, Transport, and Washout of the Radiation Plume -- 3.4 Evaluations -- 3.4.1 Approach Based on Radionuclide Release Analysis: Model 1 -- 3.4.2 Approach Based on Radiation Monitor -- 3.4.2.1 Result of the Standard Method Based on SPEEDI Simulation: Model 3 -- 3.4.2.2 Alternative Method Based on Ground Shine: Model 4 -- 3.4.2.3 Crosscheck of the Evaluation -- 3.4.3 Comparison Between Approaches -- 3.4.4 Contamination and Environmental Cleanup -- 3.5 Summary and Conclusion -- References -- 4 Environmental Contamination and Decontamination After Fukushima Daiichi Accident -- Abstract -- 4.1 Prologue -- 4.2 Environmental Contamination -- 4.2.1 Surface Radioactivity Concentrations -- 4.2.1.1 Areal Extension of Contamination -- 4.2.1.2 Radionuclides of Concern -- 4.2.1.3 Radioactivity Concentrations -- 4.2.2 Radiation Doses Due to Contamination -- 4.2.2.1 Sievert -- 4.2.2.2 Pathways that Cause Radiation Dose -- 4.2.2.3 Hourly Dose.

4.2.2.4 Annual Dose -- 4.2.3 Regulatory Guidelines -- 4.3 Modeling of Decontamination to Help Decision Making -- 4.3.1 Purpose of Modeling -- 4.3.2 Mechanisms Considered in the Model -- 4.3.2.1 Radioactive Decay -- 4.3.2.2 Natural Dispersion -- 4.3.2.3 Artificial Decontamination -- 4.3.3 Results -- 4.4 Waste Generation by Decontamination -- 4.4.1 Model and Data -- 4.4.2 Results -- 4.5 Concluding Remarks: Conflicting Values and Motives -- References -- 5 Long-Term Energy and Environmental Strategies -- Abstract -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Regionally Disaggregated DNE21 -- 5.3 Nuclear and Photovoltaic (PV) Modeling -- 5.4 Model Simulation -- 5.4.1 Simulation Assumptions and Settings -- 5.4.2 Calculated Results -- 5.5 Energy Modeling Challenge After Fukushima -- 5.6 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Impact of Fukushima Daiichi Accident on Japan's Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Spent Fuel Management -- Abstract -- 6.1 Status Quo -- 6.2 How Has This Status Quo Been Generated? -- 6.3 What Are the Problems with the Current Situation? -- References -- 7 Political Impact of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident in Europe -- Abstract -- 7.1 Earlier Accidents -- 7.1.1 The Three Mile Island Accident -- 7.1.2 The Chernobyl Accident -- 7.2 The Fukushima Accident and Radiological Impact -- 7.2.1 The Accident -- 7.2.2 The Size of the Radiological Impact Outside Japan -- 7.3 Technical Assessments and Stress Tests in Europe -- 7.3.1 IAEA Reports -- 7.3.2 The European Union -- 7.4 Political Impact in Europe from Fukushima -- 7.5 Influence of Green Politics in Europe -- References -- Part II Etiology -- 8 Where Was the Weakness in Application of Defense-in-Depth Concept and Why? -- Abstract -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Weakness in the Application of Defense-in-Depth Concept -- 8.2.1 Level 1 -- 8.2.1.1 Setting DesignEvaluation Basis -- 8.2.1.2 Technical Lessons.

8.2.1.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background -- 8.2.1.4 Possible Institutional Issue in the Background -- 8.2.2 Level 4 -- 8.2.2.1 Assumptions in Accident Management -- 8.2.2.2 Technical Lessons -- 8.2.2.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background -- 8.2.2.4 Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background -- 8.2.3 Level 5 -- 8.2.3.1 Identified Problems During the Course of Accident -- Monitoring and Ingestion Control -- Computerized Projection System -- Evacuation -- Radiation Protection Standards -- Risk Communication -- 8.2.3.2 Technical Lessons -- 8.2.3.3 Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background -- 8.2.3.4 Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background -- 8.3 Nuclear Safety Regulation -- 8.3.1 Two-Agency System -- 8.3.2 Hardware Focus -- 8.3.3 Frequent Shuffling -- 8.4 Differences in Plant Responses Among 17 Nuclear Power Plants -- 8.5 Cultural Attitude Issues -- 8.5.1 General Observation -- 8.5.2 Related Studies -- 8.5.3 Link with National Culture -- 8.5.3.1 Collectivism, Group Thinking, Insufficient CriticalReflective Thinking and Questioning Attitude, not Raising Concerns -- 8.5.3.2 Lack of Big-Picture Thinking, Losing Sight of Substance by Being Distracted by Formality and Details -- 8.5.3.3 Hardware Culture and Technology-Focus -- 8.5.3.4 Positive Aspects -- 8.5.4 Future Directions -- 8.6 Conclusions -- References -- 9 Ethics, Risk and Safety Culture -- Abstract -- 9.1 Preamble -- 9.2 Introduction -- 9.3 Preliminaries -- 9.4 Historical Perspective on Culture and Technology -- 9.5 Safety Culture, Ethics and Risk -- 9.6 Uncertainty and Safety Philosophy -- 9.7 Reflections on Fukushima Daiichi -- 9.8 Where Do We Go from Here? -- References -- 10 The "Structural Disaster" of the Science-Technology-Society Interface -- Abstract -- 10.1 Introduction.

10.2 The "Structural Disaster" of the Science-Technology-Society Interface -- 10.3 The Basic Points About the Fukushima Daiichi Accident from the Perspective of "Structural Disaster" -- 10.4 The Development Trajectory of the Kanpon Type and Its Pitfalls -- 10.5 The Accident Kept Secret -- 10.6 The Hidden Accident and the Outbreak of War with the U.S. and Britain: How Did Japan Deal with the Problem? -- 10.7 The Sociological Implications for the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Beyond Success or Failure -- 10.8 Conclusion: Prospects for the Future -- References -- 11 Three Mile Island and Fukushima -- Abstract -- Part III Basis for Moving Forward -- 12 Implications and Lessons for Advanced Reactor Design and Operation -- Abstract -- 12.1 Short Reflection of Basic Safety Issues -- 12.2 Lessons Learned and Recommendations Derived -- 12.2.1 Natural Hazards -- 12.2.2 Emergency Power Supply -- 12.2.3 Loss of Heat Sink -- 12.2.4 Hydrogen Detonation -- 12.2.5 Measurement at Severe Accidents -- 12.2.6 Management of Severe Accident -- 12.3 Recommendations and Requirements Derived from Lessons Learned -- 12.4 Examples for Potential Countermeasures andor Technologies to be Applied -- 12.4.1 External Events -- 12.4.1.1 Earthquake -- 12.4.1.2 Tsunami -- 12.4.2 Design of Buildings, Systems and Components -- 12.4.2.1 Sites with More Than One Reactor -- 12.4.2.2 Off-Site and On-Site Electricity Supply -- 12.4.2.3 Bunkering of Buildings with Safety Related Systems -- Emergency Feed Building -- Robustness of Cooling Chain in BWRs and PWRs -- 12.4.2.4 Passive Components and Systems Using Natural Forces -- Isolation Condenser -- Gravity Driven Cooling System -- Passive Containment Cooling System -- Emergency Condenser -- Containment Cooling Condenser -- Passive Pressure Pulse Transmitter -- Passive Residual Heat Removal System -- Passive Containment Cooling System.

Advanced Accumulator.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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