Intro -- Disclaimer -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Editors -- Chapter 1: Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance -- 1.1 An Introduction to the Dual-Use Nature of Emerging Biotechnology -- 1.2 History -- 1.3 Effective Governance and Policy for Biosecurity -- 1.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 2: Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Methods -- 2.3 Results and Discussion -- 2.3.1 US and EU Governmental Frameworks -- 2.3.1.1 US Framework -- 2.3.1.2 EU Framework -- 2.3.2 Threats Identified in the Literature -- 2.3.3 Responses Identified in the Literature -- 2.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Understanding the Scope and Limitations of Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology -- 3.2.1 International Instruments for Biosecurity -- 3.2.1.1 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- 3.2.1.2 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- 3.2.1.3 Australia Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and Others -- 3.2.2 National Implementation -- 3.2.2.1 Hard Law vs. Soft Law -- 3.2.2.2 Biosafety vs. Biosecurity, GMOs vs. Synthetic Biology -- 3.2.2.3 National Implementation: An Inevitable Patchwork -- 3.3 Key Novelties and Tensions Introduced by Synthetic Biology -- 3.3.1 Convergence -- 3.3.2 Democratization -- 3.3.3 Intangibility -- 3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations -- References -- Chapter 4: Biological Standards and Biosecurity: The Unexplored Link -- 4.1 Standards in Biology -- 4.2 Implications of Standards in Biosecurity in Terms of Risks -- 4.3 Universality -- 4.4 Chassis and Trojan Horses -- 4.5 Breaking Down the Species Barrier.

4.6 Standards as Social Constructs -- 4.7 Final Remarks and Open Questions -- References -- Chapter 5: Responsible Governance of Biosecurity in Armenia -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Capacity Building in Dual Use Export Control in TI Partner Countries -- 5.3 Legal Framework Governing Dual Use Life Sciences and Biosecurity -- 5.3.1 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare - Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 -- 5.3.2 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction -- 5.3.3 United Nation Security Council Resolution No. 1540 (UNSCR 1540) -- 5.3.4 National Laws and Law Enforcement -- 5.4 Ethics of Dual Use Life Sciences -- 5.5 Case Study Life Sciences and Biosecurity in Armenia -- 5.6 Dual Use Life Sciences in Armenia -- 5.7 Discussing Ethical Dilemmas -- 5.8 Conclusions and Recommendations -- References -- Chapter 6: Addressing Emerging Synthetic Biology Threats: The Role of Education and Outreach in Fostering Effective Bottom-Up Grassroots Governance -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Structure of the Synthetic Biology Community -- 6.3 Perceptions of Risks Within the Synthetic Biology Community -- 6.4 Enhancing Stakeholder Interaction in the Field of Biosafety and Biosecurity -- 6.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 7: Cyberbiosecurity and Public Health in the Age of COVID-19 -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Privacy of Contact Tracing Data -- 7.3 Protecting Public Health and Disease Surveillance Data -- 7.4 Integrity and Validation of Self-Administered Testing -- 7.5 Integrity of Public Bioinformatic Databases -- 7.6 Defending Against Cyberattacks on Laboratory Devices -- 7.7 Protection of Intellectual Property -- 7.8 Discussion.

Chapter 8: Synthetic Biology Brings New Challenges to Managing Biosecurity and Biosafety -- 8.1 Resilience as a Complimentary Philosophical Framework to Managing Potential Biohazards -- 8.2 COVID-19 Pandemic as a Call to Action for Resilience in Biosafety and Biosecurity -- 8.3 A Domain-Based Resilience Framework to Adapt to Biosecurity and Biosafety -- 8.3.1 Physical Domain -- 8.3.2 Information Domain -- 8.3.3 Cognitive Domain -- 8.3.4 Social Domain -- 8.4 Discussion -- References -- Chapter 9: Emerging Biotechnology and Information Hazards -- 9.1 What Is an Information Hazard? -- 9.2 When Do Information Hazards Matter? -- 9.3 How Might Information Hazards Be Governed? -- 9.4 Information Hazards: Where Do We Go from Here? -- References -- Chapter 10: Technical Aspects of Biosecurity: Screening Guidance, Attribution, and Traceability -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Current Technology -- 10.2.1 DNA Sequence Screening -- 10.2.1.1 State-of-the-Art -- 10.2.1.2 Next-Generation Tool Development -- 10.2.2 Attribution and Traceability -- 10.2.3 Gaps in Existing Biosecurity Technology Framework -- 10.3 Imminent Opportunities for Technology Development -- 10.3.1 Biological Threat Prevention -- 10.3.1.1 Design -- Specification -- Design Tools -- Selecting Chassis -- Tools to Enhance Tracking of Users and Research -- 10.3.1.2 Build -- Who Should Be Screening Synthesis Production in the Future? -- A Stratified White List Approach for DNA Synthesis Production -- Functional Equivalence of Sequences -- DNA Assembly and Smaller DNA Synthesis Providers -- Attribution and Tracing -- 10.3.1.3 Test -- Physical Containment -- Biology-Based Containment -- Horizontal Gene Transfer -- 10.3.1.4 Economic Drivers -- 10.3.2 Detection of Biological Threats -- 10.3.2.1 Diagnostics -- 10.3.2.2 Surveillance -- 10.3.3 Threat Response and Countermeasures.

10.4 Long-Term Opportunities for Technology Development -- 10.4.1 Implications for Adaptive Risk Management Framework -- 10.4.2 Imagining the Far Future -- Chapter 11: The Soil Habitat and Considerations for Synthetic Biology -- 11.1 The Soil System -- 11.1.1 Soil Properties -- 11.1.2 Life in Soil -- 11.2 Fitness of Genetically-Altered Organisms -- 11.2.1 Fitness of Domesticated Microorganisms -- 11.3 Considerations for Survival in Soil -- 11.3.1 Soil Conditions Influence Growth -- 11.3.2 Microbial Adaptations -- 11.3.3 Fitness of Microorganisms in Soil -- 11.4 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 12: Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.1.1 Foresight Terminology -- 12.1.2 Examples of Foresight for Biological Threats -- 12.2 Foresight Methods -- 12.2.1 General Approach -- 12.2.2 Delphi Method -- 12.2.2.1 Strengths -- 12.2.2.2 Limitations -- 12.2.3 Horizon Scanning -- 12.2.3.1 Strengths -- 12.2.3.2 Limitations -- 12.2.4 Scenario Analysis -- 12.2.4.1 Strengths -- 12.2.4.2 Limitations -- 12.3 Foresight Questions -- 12.3.1 Approach to Choosing Questions -- 12.3.2 Questions for Synthetic Biology Threats -- 12.4 Recommendations -- 12.4.1 Foresight Process Design -- 12.4.2 Synthetic Biology Considerations -- 12.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 13: Predicting Biosecurity Threats: Deployment and Detection of Biological Weapons -- 13.1 Methods of Deployment -- 13.2 Targets -- 13.2.1 Humans -- 13.2.2 Agriculture -- 13.2.3 Technology -- 13.2.4 The Environment -- 13.3 Screening Techniques -- 13.3.1 Pre-deployment: Gene Synthesis -- 13.3.2 Post-deployment: Pathogen Detection -- 13.4 Conclusion -- Literature Cited -- Chapter 14: Promoting Effective Biosecurity Governance: Using Tripwires to Anticipate and Ameliorate Potentially Harmful Development Trends -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Biological Weapons in History.

14.3 Promoting Responsible Research in Modern Biotechnology: Tripwires as a Framework to Understand Red-Team Capacity and Intent for Nefarious Deployment of Technology -- 14.3.1 Regime Characteristics that Could Lead to Synthetic Biology Weapons Development and Their Tripwires -- 14.3.1.1 Stage 1a. Bottom-Up Initiative: Independent Actors Indicate Interest in Synthetic Biology -- 14.3.1.2 Stage 1b. Top-Down Initiative: Regime Indicates Interest in Synthetic Biology -- 14.3.1.3 Stage 2. Achievement of Scientific, Technological, and Engineering Capacity for Synthetic Biology -- 14.3.1.4 Stage 3a. Active Development of Synthetic Biology Weapons -- 14.3.1.5 Stage 3b. Acquisition of Synthetic Biology Weapons from an External Source -- 14.3.1.6 Stage 4. Deployment of Synthetic Biology Weapons -- 14.3.2 Key Enabling Technologies and Technological Tripwires -- 14.4 Conclusion -- References.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2022. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.